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Swedish Shipping in Southern Europe and 
Peace Treaties with North African States: 
An Economic Security Perspective 
Leos Müller  
Abstract: »Die schwedische Schifffahrt in Südeuropa und die Friedensverträ-
ge mit den nordafrikanischen Staaten. Eine Betrachtung aus der Perspektive 
ökonomischer Sicherheit«. In the late eighteenth century, Swedish ships fre-
quently sailed in the Western Mediterranean. They could be found in Mar-
seilles, Livorno, Genoa, Alicante, Sicily, Sardinia, and North Africa, as well as 
in Cadiz and Lisbon outside the Mediterranean. Indeed, the Mediterranean was 
an area of great importance for Swedish shipping. How was it possible that 
Sweden – a small country in northern periphery of Europe – could play such a 
prominent role in carrying trade in Southern Europe? There are a number of 
plausible explanations but an especially significant factor was the fact that 
Sweden had peace treaties with North African states. The treaties improved the 
security of Swedish-flagged vessels, reducing their protection and operation 
costs, insurance premiums, etc. It was economically reasonable for foreigners 
to employ Swedish carriers. 
The topic of this essay is this connection between the establishment of peace 
relations between Sweden and North African states and the success of the 
Swedish carrying business in Southern Europe. The issue is approached from 
the protection-cost perspective (institutional economics) and related to the dif-
ferent concepts of security: state security, economic security and in a certain 
sense also human security. 
Keywords: Swedish Long-Distance Trade, Swedish Shipping Business, Swed-
ish Consular Service, Swedish Convoy Office, Barbary-States, Protection-
Costs. 
Introduction 
According to a French report from the mid-eighteenth century, the Swedish 
merchant marine was the fifth in Europe, behind that of Britain, France, the 
Dutch Republic and Denmark, but ahead of Spain and the Two Sicilies.1 Swe-
den was indeed an important maritime state, with a large carrying trade in 
Southern Europe. At the same time, by conventional economic standards, it 
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was underdeveloped country. The urbanization rate, a good indicator of Early 
Modern level of development, was extremely low in Sweden.2 What were the 
causes of the discrepancy between the large merchant fleet and the relative 
backwardness of the state’s economy? To understand this we have to look 
closer at origins of Swedish trade and shipping in Southern Europe. 
The original commercial interest of Sweden in Southern Europe was not 
shipping business: it was Portuguese salt. Carried by the Dutch, the salt from 
Setubal had already become the preferred salt quality in Sweden by the first 
half of the seventeenth century, and because the salt was a strategically impor-
tant commodity the connection with Southern European salt sources became 
strategically significant. Sweden’s trade policy in the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries paid much attention to the issue of salt supplies.3 
In the first half of the seventeenth century Sweden’s foreign trade was de-
pendent on the Dutch carrying capacity. After 1650 Sweden entered a new 
mercantilist policy aiming to reduce the kingdom’s dependency on the Dutch, 
and a part of the policy involved building up its own merchant marine for trade 
with Southern Europe. This policy was successful. In the 1670s and 1680s 
Swedish trade with Southern Europe already became a well-established trade, 
concerning a large number of ships. Swedish vessels sailed to Portugal in con-
voys loaded with bar iron, tar and pitch, and weapons, and retuned with cargoes 
of salt. About twenty vessels annually sailed to Portugal by the late century.4 
When the prices of the Portuguese salt increased dramatically, in the early 
1690s, the Swedish skippers went into the Mediterranean to find new cheaper 
sources of salt. This move opened the way for direct Swedish trade within the 
Mediterranean basin. 
However, shipping in Southern Europe was a risky business. Vessels were 
under threat from corsairs from North Africa, cargoes and vessels could be sold 
and sailors put into captivity. This even applied to Swedish vessels and Swed-
ish sailors. The guerre de course, corsair war, went on for centuries – an ex-
pression of the struggle between Muslims and Christians.5 
Barbary corsairs had often been characterized as pirates – both by contem-
poraries and in the historical literature. Such a description is not correct. The 
corsairs acted with the permission of their rulers in Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers and 
Morocco. A more proper way to characterize them is as privateers. However, 
the situation was even more complicated because Tunis, Tripoli and Algiers 
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were not independent states but vassals under formal Ottoman rule. In spite of 
this, they carried out their own “foreign policy”. Indeed, the guerre de course 
was an important argument for the legitimacy, and semi-independence, of the 
local rulers.6 The only truly independent state in North Africa was Morocco. 
The warfare did not only concern shipping. Barbary corsairs were raiding 
coastal areas of Spain and Portugal and the Canary and Balearic Islands. The 
numbers of Christian Europeans who were enslaved were substantial. In Al-
giers there were about 740,000-760,000 slaves between 1520 and 1830. In total 
there were more than a million European slaves in North Africa.7 The majority 
were Spanish and Italian, but among the slaves there were also sailors from 
Northern Europe, including Swedes and Danes. 
The European powers met the corsair challenge by naval force or by con-
voying of their shipping. But none of these strategies was efficient. The solu-
tion preferred by the North European states was instead peace treaties with the 
North African states and payment of tribute or ransom for leaving the nation’s 
merchant marine in peace. This system was fully developed by the seventeenth 
century. In Sweden the idea of establishing peace treaties with the North Afri-
can states had already appeared in the 1660s, but nothing happened then.8  
The Shipping Policy Package: 
The Swedish Navigation Act and Peace Treaties 
During the Great Northern War 1700-1721, the Swedish shipping activities in 
Southern Europe declined. Especially during the Danish involvement in the 
war, between 1709 and 1720, the Swedes were excluded from the long-distance 
carrying trade. Exports and imports were once again carried by the Dutch. The 
peace with Russia in 1721 ended the war. After that the dependency on Dutch 
shipping was heavily criticized and in the coming years Sweden launched an 
ambitious shipping policy. 
The policy package consisted of three parts. In 1724 Sweden enacted Pro-
duktplakatet, the Swedish Navigation Act, which prohibited imports to Sweden 
on other ships than those of Sweden or the cargo-producing country. 9 The Act 
was inspired by the English Navigation Acts. It was a result of the political 
discussion about the condition of Sweden’s foreign trade after 1721. The bal-
ance of trade was negative and the Dutch were accused of causing this by high 
carrying costs. Moreover, dependency on a foreign carrying capacity made 
Sweden vulnerable, which was an especially sensitive issue as regards salt 
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supplies. Salt, together with Baltic grain, was the most capacity-demanding 
import. Thus the primary aims of the new shipping policy were securing im-
ports of salt from Southern Europe and reducing the role of Dutch shipping in 
the import trade. In the long term the purpose was the strengthening of ex-
change with Southern Europe, not only the imports of the strategically impor-
tant salt but also the encouragement of exports of Swedish export produce – 
bar-iron, tar, pitch, and sawn goods. 
The Swedish Navigation Act appeared to fulfill these aims well. In the years 
immediately following 1724 the number of ships under the Swedish flag pass-
ing the Danish Sound – the best indicator of Swedish shipping activities – 
increased rapidly. The Dutch shipping to Sweden collapsed. There were in the 
Sound over a hundred Dutch ships coming from Swedish ports by 1720. In 
1725 and 1726 their numbers collapsed to six and three respectively.10 The 
number of registered ships in Sweden increased from 230 in 1723 to 480 in 
1726.11 
Thus, in the short term, the Swedish Navigation Act was a big success. Yet 
it is difficult to evaluate the effect in the long term. There was in eighteenth-
century Sweden a drawn-out discussion about the benefits and costs of the 
Navigation Act. A large number of political actors argued that it actually made 
the Swedish carrying trade more expensive, and so increased the prices of 
imports in Sweden – primarily salt – and made exports less profitable.12 
The second part of the institutional package relating to the shipping policy 
of the 1720s was the peace treaties with North Africa and the innovation of 
Sweden’s convoy system. Increasing shipping under the Swedish flag to 
Southern Europe naturally entailed problems with Barbary corsairs. The Swed-
ish policy-makers were well aware of it and in parallel with the work on the 
Navigation Act they reformed Sweden’s convoy system. A new Convoy Office 
(Konvojkommissariatet) was established in 1724, with its seat at Gothenburg 
on Sweden’s west coast. 13 This office was responsible for the organization of 
convoying, a practice that the Swedish merchant marine had used since the 
1690s. 
But convoying was not the only duty of the new office. In addition, the of-
fice was dealing with all the problems raised by Barbary corsairs. Thus it han-
dled the payments of ransom and release of Swedish sailors from North Africa. 
It soon dealt also with negotiations with the North African rulers, the exchange 
of gifts between Sweden and these states, and the keeping of consular represen-
tation on the spot. To fund the Office a new duty, the so-called extra licenten, 
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was introduced in 1723, and collected by the Convoy Fund (Konvojkassan).14 It 
is important to point out that this Swedish system differed from that of Den-
mark, even if the basic precondition of peace with the North African states was 
the same. The duty, extra licenten, was imposed on all Swedish exports and 
imports, which was perceived unfair by merchants and ship-owners who had no 
use of convoying (trade in the Baltic and North Seas). Moreover, the funding 
by extra licenten was never sufficient and the annual costs of the Convoy Of-
fice became a burden of the state.15 Consequently, the system continued to be 
controversial during the remaining part of the century – in similarity with the 
Navigation Act. However, in spite of the broad criticism, and a short break 
(1790-1797), it survived until 1867. 
Instead of expensive convoying of Swedish merchantmen in Southern 
Europe and paying ransom for captives, the Swedish authorities aimed to estab-
lish peaceful relations with the Barbary corsairs. Three years after the Swedish 
Navigation Act, in 1727, the steps were already being taken to sign a peace 
treaty with Algiers. This was actually a consequence of the Dutch treaty with 
Algiers of 1726. Before 1726, Swedish and Dutch ships went in the same con-
voys, protecting each other. The Dutch treaty of 1726, however, exclusively 
concerned the Dutch ships, which left the Swedes out in trouble. 
The Swedes empowered George Logie, a Scottish merchant with long ex-
perience of North Africa, to negotiate the treaty, in which he soon succeeded. 
The treaty between Sweden and Algiers was signed in April 1729 by Jean von 
Utfall, the Swedish representative, and the Algiers Dey. A part of the agree-
ment was the exchange of gifts, or perhaps more exactly Sweden’s tributes to 
Algiers. Sweden sent to Algiers two vessels loaded with 40 guns, 800 sabres, 
1,600 cannon balls, masts, anchors, with a total value of 21,000 rix-dollars – a 
very substantial sum. The Algiers Dey expressed his satisfaction and recipro-
cated with a liberated captive, two lions and a couple of other wild animals. 
First, the exchange confirms the picture of small European powers supplying 
the Barbary fleets with naval necessities and weapons: items that could and 
were used in the guerre de course against other European powers. Second, the 
characteristics of the exchange even had a highly symbolic meaning, stressing 
the superiority of a Muslim ruler over a Christian power.16 
Another part of the agreement was the establishment of Swedish consular 
representation in Algiers, in accordance with the traditional Mediterranean 
consular system.17 The first Swedish consul appointed to Algiers was George 
Logie. The consuls in North Africa were supposed to mediate between the 
Algiers Dey and Sweden, so the consuls had an important diplomatic function. 
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This was a significant difference in comparison with consular representations 
in European states. In France, Britain, the Dutch Republic, Russia and other 
members of the European state system, even including the Ottoman Empire, 
there was a clear distinction between the diplomatic representation, the em-
bassy at the capital, and consular representation with consulates situated at 
major ports. The consuls dealt with the promotion of commerce between their 
home and host countries and with the collection of commercially useful infor-
mation. The semi-diplomatic role of consuls in North Africa reveals the fact 
that Algiers and other Barbary states were not seen as members of the Euro-
pean state system. The commercial exchange between Sweden and North Af-
rica was very limited, in spite of the high-flying plans launched during the 
negotiations. In 1738, nine years after the signing of the treaty, George Logie 
described the state of Sweden’s trade with Algiers in these words: 
I find not that Algier can be otherways beneficiall to Sweden than that by hav-
ing peace with them it gives free liberty to our Ships to go safely on the coasts 
of Spain and Portugalland to all ports of the Mediterranean with our own Car-
goes and have the benefit of being employed and freighted by other Merchants 
with the same safety that they can ships of other nations and now I am on this 
subject I must begg leave to acquaint and inform your Lordships that I find no 
other method or possibility of keeping a firm and secure peace with the king-
dom of Algier than now and then that is once in two or three years to give 
some handsome presents to the Dey and Leading men of the Gouvernment to 
keep them steadfast in our friendship which is what is practiced by the French 
by the Hollanders and all other nations in peace with them…. 18 
The treaty between Sweden and Algiers also included an article on the in-
troduction of Algerian passports. Accordingly, all vessels under the Swedish 
flag sailing beyond Cape Finisterre in Spain were obliged to keep a special 
passport issued by Sweden’s Board of Trade. The passport confirmed for an 
inspecting corsair crew that the ship under the Swedish flag was indeed from 
Sweden, had a Swedish crew, captain and ship-owner. Without such a passport 
the ship and its crew could be taken as captives.19 
In similarity with other parts of the treaty, the introduction of Swedish Alge-
rian passports copied a model established by other North European powers. 
The issuing of Algerian passports by the Board of Trade was a regulated and 
controlled activity because abuse of passports would put in danger the whole of 
Sweden’s shipping business in Southern Europe. Articles regarding the Alge-
rian passport issued by the Swedish King on 12 January 1730 indicate how 
seriously this issue was treated.20 The strict procedure and control of the issuing 
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procedure also means that the surviving registers of passports contain reliable 
data on Swedish shipping beyond Cape Finisterre. The registers will be em-
ployed here for the mapping of Swedish shipping activities in Southern Europe. 
In 1736 George Logie left Algiers for Tunis to negotiate a peace treaty with 
another Barbary state. This treaty was signed in December 1736 and the text 
closely followed that of Algiers. Yet the gifts were not as expensive as in the 
Algiers case. The first Swedish consul arrived in 1738.21 The treaty with the 
third North African state, Tripoli, was signed in 1741, also negotiated by 
George Logie. It took another twenty years before the fourth treaty, the treaty 
with Morocco, was signed. The negotiations were opened in 1761 and the 
treaty signed in 1763. The Swedish negotiator, Peter Kristian Wulf, became the 
first Swedish consul in Morocco, seated at Salé. Morocco was the strongest and 
only truly independent North African state.  
The third part of the institutional package to promote Swedish shipping was 
the expansion of the consular system in the Mediterranean and on the Atlantic 
coast of Europe. Between 1700 and 1750 about twenty new consulates were 
established in the area – from Smyrna in the Levant to Rouen in France.22 Re-
markably, no consulates were established in Northern Europe – with the excep-
tion of the consulate in London. Sweden’s trade in Northern Europe was based 
on other, more traditional trade patterns than the trade in Southern Europe, a 
new area for the Swedes.  
The shipping policy package that the Swedish authorities launched in the 
1720s also combined a number of aims. It was supposed to replace foreign – 
read Dutch – carrying capacity in Sweden’s trade. It was supposed to secure 
sufficient supplies of salt for Sweden and open new trading opportunities for 
Swedish exports in Southern Europe. Another less apparent intent of the policy 
was the building-up of a strong Swedish merchant marine and an experienced 
marine labor that in the case of war could be recruited to the navy. This aspect 
did not receive much attention in the remaining part of the century, in spite of 
the fact that this was also common to the English and Swedish Navigation 
Acts. Finally, it was supposed to make Swedish shipping in Southern Europe 
safer, reducing risks and protection costs for the Swedish actors. This, most 
probably, was a very important aspect of the Swedish shipping boom in the 
second part of the century, a boom which has nothing to do with the Navigation 
Act of 1724. 
Swedish authorities appear to have chosen a different solution to security 
problems in North Africa in comparison with the Dutch, Danes and the Han-
seatic cities studied in Magnus Ressel’s article here. From about 1730 the 
Swedes, instead of paying ransom for individual seamen, formed a semi-
diplomatic relation with the North African states, paying gift-tributes and with 
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consular representation in the area. The system was connected to the Convoy 
Office. It was a public solution ideally financed by the special duty on trade. 
But the duty had never been sufficient to pay the system and the state was 
repeatedly forced to cover the missing sums. As the major benefactors of the 
system were a few merchants and ship-owners engaged in trade in Southern 
Europe, often members of Stockholm’s mercantile elite, the system was criti-
cized as a exploitation of public means by private interest. Such a criticism was 
a typical feature of the political struggles in eighteenth-century Sweden. In-
deed, exactly the same argument was used against the Navigation Act. 
The Costs of the Convoy Office and Shipping Activities 
From the accounts of the Convoy Office, we have a detailed picture of the 
public costs of the peace treaties with the North African states. The figures as 
such say a lot. In addition to these transparent public costs there were other 
large, less visible costs, for example in insurance premiums, relative wages of 
sailors, freight rates and others. No comparison of the costs and benefits of the 
system is possible because we have very scattered data on the profitability of 
the shipping in Southern Europe. Thus the figures may be used to illustrate 
tendencies and sudden changes in the cost structure. 
Looking at the long term development of the costs of the Convoy Office, we 
can notice a slow increase until the 1760s. The annual expenditures oscillate 
between 50,000 and 100,000 dollar silver money until the 1750s. Then they 
increase rapidly in the 1760s. The large expenditures during the 1760s related 
to the peace treaty with Morocco, which was unusually expensive. Some an-
nual expenditures are extremely large, far exceeding the average. This seems to 
be related to extraordinary outlays: special gifts related to political changes in 
the principalities, newly appointed consuls, and similar. Such appointments 
were often connected with additional tributes. The increases are related to new 
treaties signed. The graph for the period 1777-1796 (in new rix-dollars) indi-
cates a stable level of expenditure. This was the period of boom in Swedish 
shipping to Southern Europe. 
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Figure 1: The Costs of the Swedish Convoy Office 1726-1796 
(1726-1776 Dollars Silver Money) 
 
 
Figure 1 (Cont.): (1777-1796 new rix-dollars). 
 
 
Source: Karl Åmark, Sveriges statsfinanser, 1719-1809 (Stockholm, 1961), 762-775. 
Note: In 1777 Sweden introduced a new monetary system that makes it difficult to compare 
data from the periods. 
 
It is interesting to compare the development of the Office outlays with the 
data of shipping activities based on Algerian passport registers. As pointed out 
above, the registers provide a reliable data set for the long-term development of 
Swedish shipping in Southern Europe.23 The registers cover the period between 
1739 and 1831 and they include information about 30,000 passports, represent-
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ing on average about 300 voyages per annum destined south of Cape Finisterre. 
However, when we look closely at the data, it is apparent that until 1760 the 
annual number of ships never exceeded 200. The level of shipping activities 
was quite stable at about 150 voyages per annum, with a noticeable increase 
during the Seven Years’ War. This indicates that the shipping policy package 
introduced in the 1720s and 1730s did not actually have any significant effect. 
It seems to strengthen the argument of critics of mercantilist policy: that the 
policy was costly but did not promote shipping very much. 
The situation changed in the 1770s. The number of ships annually sailing 
beyond Cape Finisterre rapidly increased. First, between 1770 and 1778 the 
number of passports issued rose from 198 to 287, almost by 50 percent. An-
other jump came between 1778 and 1782, when the passports issued reached 
441, another increase by 50 percent in only five years. The expansion was 
directly related to the American War of Independence. The war entailed a 
demand for neutral carrying capacity and Sweden, which stayed out of the war, 
could provide such a capacity. The situation became even more beneficial in 
1780 when Russia, Denmark and Sweden created the League of Armed Neu-
trality. The British, who did not respect Sweden’s neutral flag before 1780, 
now began to treat the Swedes in a better way. In addition, from the end of 
1780 the Dutch Republic, the largest neutral carrier in Europe, became in-
volved in the war with Britain – the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-1784). 
The neutral Swedish and Danish vessels replaced the missing Dutch capacity.24 
It became apparent that neutral shipping could be a very profitable business for 
Sweden. 
The same strategy was then applied during the French Revolutionary Wars. 
The Dutch and French were again involved in the war against Britain, leaving 
the Danish and Swedish – and this time even the US – merchant marines as the 
neutral tonnage. According to the Swedish Algerian passport registers, the 
number of Swedish-flagged voyages increased from 257 in 1792 to 624 in 
1800. The figures for the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815) are volatile owing to a 
new vulnerability of European neutrals. The policy employed by the Dutch, 
Danes and Swedes between 1756 and 1800 did not work during the total war of 
1804-1815. 
The picture of Swedish shipping booms directly related to the wartime con-
ditions is confirmed by the data for traffic in the Sound and the development of 
registered Swedish vessels.25 Does this mean that the Anglo-French warfare 
and Sweden’s neutrality are the only determinants of the development, and that 
the shipping policy package from the early eighteenth century is insignificant? 
We have seen that the shipping policy package of the 1720s did not matter 
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much. Such a view would confirm the criticism of shipping policy by contem-
poraries, but it would not explain why the policy was also used during the 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and why it survived until the mid-
nineteenth century. 
The peaceful relations with North Africa and the consular network in South-
ern Europe were the precondition of the development. A very large share of the 
Swedish shipping boom in the 1770s, 1780s and the 1790s was located in 
Southern Europe. About one third of the Swedish carrying capacity was actu-
ally employed in Southern Europe, in commodity trade and tramp shipping.26 
All this suggests that the shipping policy package was necessary. The willing-
ness of authorities to pay for the Convoy Office and to accept the costs of keep-
ing peace relations with North Africa also confirms that the policy was seen as 
a necessity. Without the peace in North Africa, Swedish ships would be at risk 
in the Mediterranean even during the Napoleonic Wars.  
The significance of peace in the Mediterranean is illustrated by the last con-
flict between Sweden and a Barbary state, namely the Tripoli “war” of 1801-
1802. The Swedish naval presence outside Tripoli was of no avail, nor was 
cooperation with the US navy. Eventually peace was bought at a price of 
650,000 rix-dollars.27 
Figure 2: Number of Algerian Passports Issued 1739-1820 
 
Source: Kommerskollegium, Huvudarkivet, Sjöpassdiarier för åren 1739-1800, C II b. Board 
of Trade, Swedish National Archives, Stockholm. 
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Economic Security, National Security, and 
the Protection-Cost Approach  
The differences between the Swedish policy regarding North African states and 
the exploitation of Sweden’s neutrality point at the diverse options that Sweden 
had regarding security and risk-diminishing strategies. Sweden’s eighteenth-
century neutrality was vulnerable, dependent on the good will of Britain and 
other great powers and the overall functioning of an anarchical European state 
system.28 Sweden had very limited possibilities of influencing the behavior of 
the great powers. A military confrontation was out of reach; the only way to 
meet the challenge of a great power was through diplomatic means. The same 
limited options, and a final failure of neutrality policy, may be noted in the 
Dutch Republic and in Denmark. All three neutrals were forced into “impossi-
ble” wars against great powers: the Dutch Republic (1780) and Denmark 
(1807) against Britain, and Sweden (1808) against Russia. That kind of risk 
was also impossible to predict, calculate or insure against. The peace with 
Russia or Britain could not be bought for any calculable price, which points at 
the different kind of security concept in this context – namely national secu-
rity.29 
The vulnerability of Swedish shipping in Southern Europe was of a different 
kind. It could be met by combined diplomatic and economic means. The threat 
posed by Barbary corsairs concerned economic security – the possibility of a 
loss of cargo and ship, and human security – the possibility of captivity or 
enslavement. But the threat never concerned the national security of Sweden. 
This distinction is very important if we aim to study Swedish shipping in 
Southern Europe from an economic perspective. National security, on the one 
hand, is about the state’s security; the issue of costs or profits does not matter if 
the state is in danger. Economic security, on the other hand, is about costs and 
profitability of a business. Regarding the situation in the Mediterranean, the 
security was about protection costs and competitive advantages, and human 
risks, not about the threat to national security. 
The role of protection costs in shipping has traditionally been related to the 
successful development of seaborne trade. European seaborne trade expanded 
during the whole Early Modern period, and the expansion could not be ex-
plained by any significant technological change in shipping which would affect 
the production costs of shipping. Indeed, a sailing ship of 1800 did not differ 
very much from a sailing ship of 1500, whereas a steam ship of 1900 was very 
different in comparison with a sailing ship of 1800. Thus, the expansion of 
seaborne trade before 1800 had to be explained in another way. 
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One explanation that has attracted much attention and that is relevant in the 
context of this essay is the decline in transport costs.30 The larger the share of 
transport costs in the commodity price, the larger the impact of the decline in 
transport costs on the final commodity price. Lower transport costs made 
commodities cheaper and so more affordable. With a limited technological 
change in shipping before the mid-nineteenth century, the most efficient way to 
reduce overall transport costs was the decline in transaction and protection 
costs. The issue of protection costs is especially interesting in waters that were 
troubled by violence, such as the Mediterranean owing to the guerre de course. 
Even small improvements in the security of shipping could significantly im-
prove the profitability of the whole business. Improved security of shipping had 
an impact on many other costs. It reduced insurance premiums. The lower 
insurance premiums are actually mentioned by Swedish consuls as a competi-
tive advantage of Swedish shipping in the Mediterranean.31 Most probably, 
improved security made seamen less hesitant to sail in the Mediterranean and 
so it might have reduced wages. Contemporary treatises show that Swedish and 
Danish sailors were paid less than their Southern counterparts, even if this fact 
cannot immediately be related to the improved security of Danish and Swedish 
shipping.32 
The protection cost approach was first employed by Frederic C. Lane, a his-
torian of Venice, to explain the success of Venice as a commercial republic. He 
pointed out the significance of a state that provides security for the shipping of 
its citizens. In this way protection costs are made public: instead of paying for a 
large crew and armaments on his ship, the ship-owner pays the state for protec-
tion.33 
The Swedish historian Jan Glete employed the same logic to explain the 
boom of Dutch seaborne trade in the Baltic Sea. The royal navies of Denmark 
and Sweden made the Baltic waters safe and so kept the protection costs low – 
especially of Dutch shipping. The Fluit could be such a superior carrier in the 
Baltic trade because it sailed in relatively safe waters.34 
Glete’s and Lane’s works were concerned primarily with the sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean. But the same approach 
might be used to characterize the Northern European policies toward the Bar-
bary corsairs in the eighteenth century. The policy package employed by Swe-
den from the 1720s made the protection costs of Swedish ship-owners public, 
and the ship-owners paid the state for protection – extra licenten. Because the 
                                                             
30  For the effect of the decline in transport costs (transport revolution) on the expansion of 
overseas trade see O’Rourke and Williamson 2002; O’Rourke and Williamson 2004; for a 
contrary view see Flynn and Giraldez 2004; and others. 
31  Müller 2004, 73. 
32  Liljencrants 1768. 
33  Lane 1950; Lane 1958. 
34  Glete 2000, 125-126; on the fluit design’s advantages see Barbour 1996, 122-123. 
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use of naval force – convoying – was expensive and inefficient, the office 
instead chose to pay for security by the acknowledgment of North African 
states and payments of tributes.  
Sweden, owing to the peace treaties with the North African states and owing 
to its neutrality, had low protection costs, and these costs were made public. 
Certainly, this was an important factor for the improved economic security of 
the shipping business under the Swedish flag and one explanation for the suc-
cessful development of the Swedish merchant marine, becoming the fifth in 
Europe after the American War of Independence.  
It is worth mentioning that even Douglass C. North, a Nobel laureate in eco-
nomics, and his colleague Gary M. Walton back in the 1960s argued that the 
success of North American shipping in the eighteenth century was related to 
the reduced uncertainties such as piracy and privateering.35 Another factor was 
the improved organization of shipping, but that is not our focus here. The pro-
tection-cost approach employed in the development of Swedish shipping in 
Southern Europe also relates closely to the neo-institutional economic school, 
to the idea of protection costs as a component of transaction costs. 
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